Mayor De Blasio

The Mayor's Plan to Fix NYCHA Will Nix Public Housing (But Don't Blame Him)

Isaacs Houses (homebodynetwork)

Isaacs Houses (homebodynetwork)

Yesterday Mayor de Blasio announced an updated plan to fix the crumbling public housing stock in NYC before it falls into federal receivership — and even more uncertainty. The plan calls for selling air rights, allowing developers to build on NYCHA land, and most radically of all, transferring 1/3 of all NYCHA homes to private manage. 

If all goes according to the plan, these programs will still only account for 75% of the $32 billion in needed upgrades for NYCHA, leaving the remaining funding in the hands of an uncommitted Governor Cuomo and an openly hostile federal administration. 

It also doesn’t provide any new housing opportunities for the 360,000 New York families on the waiting list for NYCHA or Section 8 vouchers or the more than 60,000 homeless New Yorkers.

I don’t envy the Mayor’s position. This is his best option to find the significant cash infusion for upgrades to a vast system. NYCHA manages 176,000 homes across 2,400 buildings. Almost half of NYCHA developments are 50 years or older. Decades of underinvestment from the federal government (and years of mismanagement at NYCHA) has compounded to put many buildings on the brink of permanent decline and eventual condemnation. Over 400,000 New Yorkers live in NYCHA and deserve dramatic and fast solutions. The fact that this is the best option is not on the Mayor.

But let’s be clear what this plan represents: this is an admission that the idea of public housing in the US is over — from a progressive mayor in a progressive city with a long history of successful stewardship of public housing. 

There are 1.3 million publicly owned homes in the US, but NYCHA is by far the largest concentration of them. For 80 years, it has stood out as a well managed bastion of affordable housing, in sharp contrast to other cities that never had the political support to properly invest in a system. For every Pruitt-Igoe or Cabrini-Green in another city, there is a Queensbridge or Williamsburg Houses here. These developments aren’t perfect, but they are providing affordable homes and stable communities for thousands of New Yorkers. NYCHA showed that public housing worked.

The real story of NYCHA is how resilient it has proved to be despite a hostile federal government and indifferent public that have betrayed it at every corner over the last forty years. Just since 2001, the federal government has cut over $3 billion in operational funding. It’s only recently that NYCHA has started to fracture and it’s miraculous that it endured as well as it did under the circumstances.

 If after all of that, we’re throwing in the towel on NYCHA now, we’re throwing it in everywhere. At a time when virtually the entire country is feeling the pain of the affordable housing crisis, this is the exact opposite of what we need to do. 

One out of three American households (38 million) are cost burdened. Half of all renters are cost burdened (which has doubled over the last 50 years) and a quarter are severely burdened. Since 2000, the number of Americans living in poverty has increased by 28% to 12.8 million. In 2016 alone, 1.4 million people (including 175,000 families with children) were homeless at some point during the year. 

In New York City, it’s even worse. Half of all renters in NYC are rent burdened, including virtually all low-income households. Homelessness is at record numbers. Displacement of low-income communities is rampant. 

What is truly scary about all of this is that it is happening during one of the longest periods of economic growth in our history. 

At precisely the time where we need bold, transformative federal leadership on housing, when we need more public housing, the federal government under the Trump administration is retreating even further. 

Last month, HUD Secretary Carson sent a letter to public housing authorities outlining HUD’s plan to dramatically reduce the stock of public housing in the US. Housing advocates fear that next year they will see severe budget cuts to public housing and other housing programs.

It’s not enough to blame President Trump or Republicans. The Democratic Party doesn’t support public housing either. Despite champions like Rep. Barbara Lee, Nydia Velazquez, or Hakeem Jeffries, the party overall, and particularly during the Obama Administration, has actively supported privatization of public housing which demonstrably leads to a reduction of affordable housing. The Democratic Party has never made public housing the priority it should be and millions of Americans, not just NYCHA residents, have suffered as a consequence.

Instead, both parties have embraced subsidizing homeownership and incentivizing the private market to build affordable housing units for decades. The result of this bipartisanship is skyrocketing home and rental prices and millions of missing affordable homes.

The mayor’s plan in part reflects this ugly reality. The central component of the plan is the expansion of the controversial Obama-era Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. The mayor proposes transferring 62,000 homes — one third of the system — into private management supported by Section 8 vouchers. NYCHA would still own the properties, but private developers would be able to leverage private capital markets to make repairs and then collect rents on a 99-year lease. The mayor estimates that this process (which includes non-RAD programs as well) would generate $12.8b in repairs.

RAD has become liberal’s “best idea” for a long-term solution for public housing. That’s understandable. Given the way public housing is framed nationally, it represents the only idea to raise large amounts of capital for public housing right now. Many cities, like San Francisco, have or are in the process of converting their entire public housing stock into the RAD program. 

In NYC, developments have already been converted. The biggest so far, Ocean Bay in the Rockaways, has been viewed as validation for the program. The infusion of capital has led to renovations for all apartments and a palpable improvement in the quality of life for residents. This is of course welcome for the New Yorkers in these buildings. 

But what Ocean Bay proves is, wait for it, the quality of buildings and the quality of life for residents improves when you invest money in them. There is nothing intrinsically better about private management, other than there is political support to subsidize it. NYCHA used to be a model of property management because it used to have enough money to do it well too. 

In the short term, RAD-fueled private management might be a godsend to residents compared to a slowing and staggering NYCHA. But this is an illusion. The reality is, housing low-income residents is massively expensive, especially in older large-scale buildings. Adding the need for private firms to profit only increases the cost to the public in the long run.

At some point in the not too distant future, these private firms will no doubt come back to the table looking for more money. Roofs leak, elevators breakdown, boilers need replacing and investors change their expectations.

Incomes aren’t likely to increase for these residents, especially as the population ages, to cover higher costs. The cost of climate change (either adaption or mitigation) will eventually materialize and will likely be prohibitive given the location of so many developments near water. 

No amount of current tenant protections within RAD will stop the need to either raise rents or increase public subsidies to keep these private firms in business. 

No institution other than the federal government can handle the nation’s housing needs now or tomorrow. It is simply more efficient and more equitable to build, own, and manage these homes publicly through federal funding. 

It is bad enough that our society can’t produce economic prosperity and security for all of its citizens, but it is especially perverse to allow private interests to profit from the housing of the poor and working class, especially when it is clear that the private market is utterly incapable of meeting the affordable housing needs of our nation.

You might argue that the public shouldn’t be concerned about doing this, but you would be wrong. Unless our economy is rebooted to spread wealth and security to everybody, the increasing winner-take all society we live in will cease to have any legitimacy for the poor and working class (to the extent that it has any left). At its mildest the resulting pain will cause an exorbitant cost in social services and lost economic productivity. At its most severe, it will cause mass unrest and social revolution.

The Mayor has many flaws, but he can not carry all of the weight for NYCHA’s misfortunes. We’ll find out tomorrow in court if the Mayor’s plan is enough to avoid federal receivership. Surly the federal government doesn’t want to take responsibility for NYCHA.

That’s not good enough. We must demand that the federal government provide the funding necessary not only to upgrade existing NYCHA properties, but to expand public housing to guarantee that all Americans have a safe, clean affordable home where ever they need it. But until enough Democrats wake up about the housing crisis, we’ll keep seeing the steady, miserable erosion of public housing in the US.

Comptroller Stringer: NYC’s Housing Plan Isn’t Helping 582,000 Low-Income Households (Via Data For Progress

Not even close (homeBodynetwork)

Not even close (homeBodynetwork)

This article originally appeared in Data for Progress

On Thursday, City Comptroller Scott Stringer published a startling report on the affordable housing crisis in New York City that shows a significant gap between the housing needs of extremely low-income New Yorkers and the targets of Mayor de Blasio’s Housing New York 2.0 Plan. The report also proposes a couple of intriguing progressive ways to address it.

In total, 585,000 New York City households with very-low to extremely-low incomes face severe housing pressure, representing nearly 20% of the city’s population. Looking into the numbers a bit closer, an estimated 515,000 New York City households face severe rent burdens and overcrowding. Two-thirds of these households make less than $28,000 per year and are paying a staggering 74% of their monthly income towards rent.  

Chart 1: Income Distribution and Rent-to-Income Ratios of NYC Rental Households 2005 - 2016

Chart 1.png

More disturbingly, a record 60,000 New Yorkers are living in homeless shelters, despite a third of them having jobs. There are 5,000 families with children that have been living in shelters for over a year and another 2,000 that have been there for two years. In just 4 years, the city’s spending on homeless services has doubled to nearly $3 billion. (Chart 2)

Chart 2: Growth in Spending on Homelessness and Average Shelter Population

That’s a daunting amount of need, but the mayor’s housing plan has barely attempted to target it. The plan, which Stringer acknowledged was the most ambitious since the Koch Administration, calls for the preservation or construction of 300,000 affordable housing units by 2026 at a cost of $83 billion (up from 200,000 and $43 billion when the plan was introduced in 2014). To date, 75,285 units have been preserved and 34,482 new units have been constructed, which puts the plan at just over one-third of the way completed.

Chart 3: The Need vs. Housing New York Plan 2.0 Targets

Screen Shot 2018-11-29 at 5.45.09 PM.png

However, as you can see from Chart 3, only 25% of the 300,000 units have been allotted for very-low to extremely-low income households, despite those households representing 88% of the most severely distressed in the city. To put it in context, even if the plan is successful, it will have built 75,000 units to service a population of 515,000 households.

Groups like Real Affordability for All have criticized the mayor’s housing plan for ignoring low-income households before, but Comptroller Stringer’s report is less a criticism and more of a suggested pivot. It includes three proposals for the city to realign the existing housing plan towards these low-income households.

First, it suggests committing the remaining target of 85,000 new construction units to extremely-low income households. Second, it suggests raising the percentage of units set aside for homeless families from 5% to 15%.  Third, and most radically, it proposes a new operating subsidy for landlords for preserved units that go to extremely low-income households to help landlords.

Those won’t be cheap. According to the report, targeting extremely-low income households for the remaining 85,000 new construction units would require an additional $370 million per year, while the operating subsidy would be $125 million per year. Both numbers deserve more scrutiny, particularly the operating subsidy, which has been suggested on a larger scale by some notable presidential hopefuls but has come under harsh criticism.

For progressives, the most interesting aspect of the report is how it proposes creating new sources of revenue to cover the costs.  Comptroller Stringer first turns to his long-held support for creating a Land Bank to give city-owned vacant lots to non-profit developers and community land trusts, vastly reducing the cost of new construction. His office estimates that the 1,000 plus current inventory of vacant lots could produce close to 40,000 units. These units would have the benefit of being permanently affordable and locally-owned.

More significantly, he proposes a progressive change in how to tax home purchases. Currently, a potential buyer who pays in cash pays less tax than a buyer financing through a mortgage. This quirk exists because the city and state tax the purchase price through the Real Property Transfer Tax (RPTT) and the mortgage through the Mortgage Recording Tax (MRT), which effectively double-taxes people who can’t afford to pay in cash.

This is backwards for two reasons. Obviously it makes it even more expensive for middle class and working class families to buy homes in the city. It also grossly under taxes high-dollar cash transactions made almost exclusively by anonymous high-wealth individuals, foreign investors, and private equity firms. The report highlights the fact that in 2016, 80% of Manhattan condo purchases over $5 million were all cash.

Chart 4: Current and Proposed NYC Transaction Tax Rates on NYC Property

Screen Shot 2018-11-29 at 5.45.32 PM.png

The report suggests eliminating the MRT altogether and installing a new, progressive rate schedule for the RPTT, as seen in Chart 4. Although still relatively low compared to other global cities like London or Singapore, the tax could potentially create $400 million in new revenue (while reducing the tax burden on a middle-class buyer). Even if a higher tax lowers the volume of sales, scaring off the speculative frenzy enveloping the city would be welcome on its own.

Comptroller Stringer suggests that this tax would more than cover the cost of the report’s proposals. He also suggests that if enacted, the proposal would likely reduce spending in other areas, particularly around homeless services.

That may be the case, but the political path forward remains murky. Like a lot of progressives in the city, Comptroller Stringer is banking on the new Democrat majority in Albany being open to his proposals, but that line is long and loud. The City Council has been sitting on a land bank bill for several years and might not be eager to support a potential rival for 2021 (He notably doged any discussion about running for mayor). Most importantly, Mayor de Blasio is never eager for outside input into his administration, let alone on his signature policy.

Regardless of the politics, this report outlines a city in dire need for bolder action to address the affordable housing crisis while there is still time. The city’s government has become over reliant on skyrocketing real estate prices fueled by faceless investors and foreign entities while ignoring the lived experience of everyday struggling New Yorkers. That might be easier to ignore when the economy is growing overall, but it will be impossible to forgive when it inevitably goes in the other direction.

Stop Blaming the Mayor for the Homelessness Crisis, It's On Us

More like a flood (NYDailyNews)

More like a flood (NYDailyNews)

A lot has been made this week of Mayor de Blasio’s announcement of new homeless shelters around the city.  He has been criticized from all different sides, from community groups opposed to more shelters in their neighborhoods, to non-profit groups worried about getting paid for their services, and by political rivals questioning the Mayor’s effectiveness on the crisis.

However, this week also saw a settlement of a lawsuit at the state-level over rental assistance that quietly did more for the crisis than anything the mayor can do.  This speaks to the deeper structural problems causing homelessness in the city and why the political charade around the shelter system is missing the point entirely. The problem is bigger and deeper than any mayor can handle and we’re all partly to blame.

The lawsuit stemmed from the state’s Family Eviction Prevention Supplement (FEPS) program that started in 2005.  For women with children under a certain economic threshold facing eviction, the program offered rental supplements based on a formula set when the program began.  Rents have of course skyrocketed since 2004 while the payments remained flat, so many families were simply not benefiting from the program.

With the help of Legal Aid Society, two women successful sued the state to change the rent allotments to reflect the changing market.  A family of three that used to only qualify for $850/m now can get $1515 a month.  The new formula isn’t perfect, but it will no doubt help thousands of families in New York City under threat of eviction to stay in their apartments.

This is an important program because it has a simple mission: prevent eviction to prevent homelessness.  There are over 60,000 homeless in NYC of which 48,000 are women and children.  The number one cause of homelessness for this group is eviction.  Keeping these vulnerable citizens in their homes not only safeguards their well-being and future prospects, but it also saves taxpayers millions of dollars and lessens the burden on the few communities that host these shelters.

As the Mayor is finding out, it is both expensive and, at times, unpopular to shelter the homeless.  And he can’t simply ignore it.  Since 1979, the homeless in NYC have had a legal right to shelter. The Giuliani and Bloomberg administrations both fought to undermine this law, so it is a credit to the de Blasio Administration for not taking the easy way out.

It is a significant financial burden for the city to maintain the shelter system. NYC Department of Homeless Services has an annual budget of $1 billion and the Mayor’s Office estimates that it costs $44,000 to shelter a family for a year.  However, even the most ardent supporters recognize that DHS is barely a stopgap that doesn’t come close to meeting the basic sustainable needs of New Yorkers entering the system.

The shelter system also clusters in only a few communities in the city, which puts a potentially unfair burden on them relative to others.  It’s important to note that very few shelters actually cause ancillary quality of life problems for surrounding communities.  However, when only a few communities host most of them, this concentration inevitably has an impact that other neighborhoods don’t experience. It's unfortunate that many citizens don't want to help the homeless, but it's reasonable to ask all of us to share the burden equally.  We are not. 

All of this is to say that the Mayor has a nearly impossible task.  He has clearly placed too much political capital on his ability to solve this crisis, which is now costing him, but he has made progress.  Guaranteeing counsel in housing court for low-income tenants is a major victory in preventing homelessness. Finding additional resources for new shelters, however controversial, is also commendable.

Look, Mayor de Blasio can’t end the homelessness crisis. No mayor can.  The politics around the mayor’s handling of the crisis mask the larger problems that must be addressed at all levels of government.  Many people recognize this, even if most of the media only focuses on the horserace stuff.  

For example, today State Assemblyman Hevesi, a Democrat from Queens, proposed a state bill to provide comprehensive rental assistance to families receiving public aid.  The plan, called Home Stability Support, would replace FEPS and potentially help 80,000 families across the state, including NYC with real, reliable rent assistance.

The program is estimated to cost $450 million a year, but Assemblyman Hevesi makes a compelling case that it save money in the long run.  Compared to $44,000/year to shelter a family, this program would potentially cost just $11,000 per family.  Scott Stringer has estimated that the plan could the city save hundreds of millions of dollars.  Of course there are complex issues to address around intended/unintended consequences, but this seems worthy of support.

It’s not clear how much support there would be in Albany, though, and it seems very unlikely we can bank on federal help, so the future of the bill is questionable.  But it makes a strong economic argument for supporting greater rental assistance.  We are already paying an immense amount of money sheltering the homeless in NYC and that won’t end anytime soon.  Why not intervene earlier and put less money towards a more efficient policy?

It is crass to approach the homelessness crisis on economic terms, but starting there hopefully allows us to consider the issue on moral terms.  And we should.  We are making the choice right now not to help thousands of citizens who are economically insecure, who have lost their home or are close to losing it.  It is entirely in our power to solve this problem if we choose to. It is wrong that we do not. Blaming Mayor de Blasio lets us off the hook too easily.

As much as the right to shelter for the homeless has been fought by various city and state officials over the years, we must think bigger.  A right to housing for all residents should be an obligation of the state that falls under its public welfare mandate.  New York has always been a laboratory of progressive governance and we should continue this tradition when it matters this much to so many.  We need to make sure the state follows through on this obligation. 

Far from requiring huge amounts of new revenue, committing to housing as a right would allow the city and state to review the many programs and laws that currently apply money as band-aids all along the housing cycle.  It’s easy to see how such a simple policy goal could unleash innovative public programs, private partnerships, and lead to an overall reboot for thinking about housing in New York.  This is clearly what we need to do if we want to address the homelessness and affordability crises - and actually end them. It starts with every one of us deciding that housing is a right.

Governor Cuomo Wants You to Pay Developers' Labor Costs

You guys got it, right? (truthaboutguns)

You guys got it, right? (truthaboutguns)

Housing construction is complicated in New York City, but leave it to Governor Cuomo to make a bad thing worse.  The Governor had already single-handedly killed negotiations on 421a, the infamous tax subsidy to developers who agree to construct some affordable housing units, in the midst of Mayor de Blasio’s push to pass his ambitious housing plan.  As a result, hundreds of affordable units, and perhaps the Mayor’s entire housing plan, have remained in limbo. The Governor’s recently proposed solution makes matters worse.

Readers of this blog will be familiar with the problems that arose through the implementation of 421a since it was passed in 1971.  It was conceived while the NYC market was at its nadir, but quietly became a massive cash-transfer for developers when the market rebounded.  It has cost the city hundred of millions of dollars in lost tax revenue over the last decade’s hot market run, prompting many housing advocates to call for it to be abolished outright when it was set to expire last year. 

Mayor de Blasio took a different approach when putting his two major housing policy initiatives together last year.  The Mayor’s plan relied heavily on remodeling 421a with input from developers and construction union leaders.  He appears to have understood the political need for developers and construction unions to buy into his plan and the economic need for some type of tax benefit to spur development with his new requirements.  At the time that the law was up for renewal, the mayor was working with unions and developers on a compromised 421a version that would allow some non-union labor on certain housing projects that fell under the proposed guidelines.

It would be one thing if the Governor was against 421a from a policy standpoint but, in many circles, the governor’s last minute insistence on prevailing wage levels was seen as a direct attempt to kill the mayor’s plan for personal reasons.  The long-simmering tensions between the Governor and the Mayor, despite both being Democrats and broadly agreeing on policy, has been a major impediment to state and city policy-making on a number of issues.  Given the Governor’s track record, it’s hard not to look at his action as a petty lashing out.  The situation may be petty but the stakes are real - over the last eight months, a number of developments have been put on hold or out right cancelled over the 421a uncertainty.

To some degree, Governor Cuomo had political coverage at the time because he promised to announce his own detailed $2b housing plan.  The Governor created the impression that, if he was blocking Mayor de Blasio, it was because his plan was bigger and better. We’ll never know because he has never revealed his plan.  It, along with the $2b, quietly got pushed from the agenda until next year.

Instead, Governor Cuomo sent out a one-page outline to developers that suggested restoring 421a with prevailing wave requirements with the state directly subsidizing the differences for developers.  This type of direct wage intervention is virtually unprecedented. Taxpayers will literally be writing checks to construction workers to the tune of millions of dollars.

At least we think.  We don’t really know the true cost of this proposal because there aren’t many details about where the money would come from, what projects would get covered, who would administer and monitor the payments, and what if any restrictions or caps would be installed.  Although some numbers have been mentioned under some circumstances, the publicly available information is sparse.

To the extent that other parties are able to comment on the proposal as it stands, developers appear to be open to further consideration (as you would expect) and even Mayor de Blasio has offered support if the state holds to its obligation of paying those wages instead of the city.  We can expect a lot of closed-door talks to take place into the fall.

Governor Cuomo’s political antics against the Mayor and NYC in general have always appeared petty and vindictive to me.  It’s not the first time a governor has been nakedly jealous or resentful towards a mayor of NYC, but given the stakes of this particular issue – lest we forget this is about addressing the affordable housing crisis – the governor’s actions are a stunning failure of leadership.

Simply put, no taxpayer should support a vague plan to directly subsidize a developer’s construction costs.  Taxpayers should support the right to fair wages and safe working conditions for construction workers, but these are not, nor should the governor try to make them into, related issues.  This type of policy proposal is ill-conceived and potentially reckless.

If 421a is necessary for all parties to move forward right now, fine.  There will need to be complicated discussions and complicated agreements.  I certainly concede that there are no simple solutions to creating more housing under the existing framework. Though I argue that there are more options to consider and more ideas to explore to improve the creation of affordable housing in NYC, we must get the best possible agreement from all invested stakeholders.  If the Governor is secretly setting on a much better plan, I am all ears.

The Governor should be held accountable for holding up progress on affordable housing in the state.  He should be held accountable for promising then punting on a major $2b housing proposal.  And he should be held accountable for continuing to operate behind closed-doors and in vague terms.  Every stakeholder in the housing market, whether public or private, corporation or citizen, deserves better leadership.

Why Mayors and Governors in New York Rarely Get Along and Why it's a Problem

Leave the bonds. Take the Cannoli. (north country public radio)

Leave the bonds. Take the Cannoli. (north country public radio)

Several news outlets in the city are reporting on the latest beef between Mayor de Blasio and Governor Cuomo and how it could harm upcoming housing projects in the city.  This particular beef is over federal tax-free bonds made available to states to encourage construction of affordable housing, but it represents just one rift of many between the two Democrats.  Troubling as this feud is for residents of NYC, it is part of an old, long-standing Great Game between the two most visible elected offices in the state and represents a much bigger problem with politics in New York.

First, the details of the bond feud matter a great deal in the ongoing affordability crisis in NYC. For decades, federal bonds (worth about $900m in 2014 and $700m in 2015) have been dolled out from New York State to New York City with little state interjection. These funds are tax-exempt on the federal, state, and city level which makes them attractive to developers and generally follows certain guidelines ensuring the creation of affordable housing units. The city has used these bonds in about 40% of recent affordable housing projects according to the NY Times article.

However, starting last year the state has begun to withhold money, which already delayed a city plan to develop 1,200 units. This trend has continued as state officials have been quietly informing city officials and developers over the last month that the city will no longer receive the same levels of money.  The funds that the city will get will now be micro-managed by the state through the Empire State Development Corporation and Public Authorities Control Board.  City officials and developers appear to be confused about why this change has occurred and are uncertain about how it will affect developments that have been approved or are close to construction. 

The Governor has downplayed the changes stating that they are intended to "supplement" rather than "supplant" the city's plan but so far has not made any of his own $20b housing plan's details public (he is expected to do so in April.) Given that Mayor de Blasio has made affordable housing a signature policy focus, these changes in funding options clearly put his housing plan at risk and the timing of the announcement has certainly raised eye-brows across the city and state.

The big question is if the money will still eventually be allotted to the same projects with the same goals that the Mayor has laid out.  If that is the end result, it will be hard not to view the move as a petty power grab by the Governor.  If, on the other hand, the Governor's housing plan is radically different than the Mayor's then it would be easier to claim that it represents a new policy focus, but could still have severe consequences for current projects. Either way, it is very public rebuff of the Mayor's agenda and throws many affordable housing projects up in the air.

Though some of the feud between the Mayor and the Governor might be chalked up to personality clashes or political differences, the reality is that this dynamic has been common in New York state politics for decades and speaks to a larger issue of political disfunction. The main culprits for this dynamic are New York State's unique history and geography.

New York State counties by geography and relative population size (maps4office)

New York State counties by geography and relative population size (maps4office)

The modern state border of New York evolved through a series of (still contested) treaties with the Iroquois Confederacy before and after The French and Indian War and the British after the Revolutionary War but also through equally contested agreements with Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. This has created a widely varied geographical entity with little practical cohesion.  In 1797, Albany was chosen as the permanent capital city because it was central enough for state legislators to travel to and it didn't overly bias the state's business towards the dominance of New York, which by 1835 became the largest city in the country. This tension defines the state to this day.

As a result of its geography, New York State is better viewed as two distinct sub-states which are referred to as "upstate" and "downstate".  The definitions are debated, but generally Upstate New York is considered everything north and east of Westchester County and made up of smaller cities and rural communities while downstate consists of the metropolitan region of New York including Westchester and Long Island.  Out of 19.7 million state residents, 63% live downstate with 40% living in NYC. 

Politically, upstate has generally been more conservative than the downstate metropolitan region but the population difference has made New York an uncontested blue state, voting Democratic in every presidential election since 1988.  However, at the state level, given the structure of the State Senate, Republicans have held power almost exclusively since WWII, balancing out the large population difference between upstate and downstate.

This creates a unique political dynamic that some have even argued should be formally separated. That's not going to happen, but it shows just how different the two sub-states are in reality.  It also explains the different constituencies that a mayor and governor have to play to.  Even though Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio are both Democrats, and both broadly agree on many issues, they have to navigate vastly different political territory and interests. 

This is absolutely true of any governor/mayor relationship, but the size of New York City and its importance both nationally and internationally create different perceptions of the two offices. With the potential exception of Illinois/Chicago, no other state has a situation where the mayor of its major city is better known than its governor. That can create some bruised egos.

Further complicating the relationship is the fact that, though the mayor of New York City is generally higher profile, in reality the governor has significantly more power over the city.  Whether its tax policy, economic development funds, the MTA, the Port Authority, or housing laws the Governor controls much of New York City from Albany.  This creates a lot of tension between the offices, especially when they are held by the same party - whether it was Mayor Lindsay-Governor Rockefeller in the early 1970s, Mayor Koch-Governor (Mario) Cuomo in the 1980s, or Mayor Bloomberg-Governor Pataki in the 2000s.  If you're the mayor and the governor is the same party, you almost have to expect more opposition given the structure of power in Albany.

The upstate/downstate divide isn't just about political personalities clashing for headlines.  It has a major impact on policy decisions because it warps voter representation and turnout.

I've already mentioned how the population tilt makes it a safe blue state nationally for Democrats while the balance of power in the State Senate has been dominated by Republicans since WWII because of redistricting.  This balance is a false and dangerous one perpetuated by both parties.  Senate districts have overrepresented upstate while Assembly districts have overrepresented downstate making sure the status quo remains intact. This has resulted in stunning corruption across the state and has frozen the political discourse.

Senate Districts (latfor)

Senate Districts (latfor)

It has also caused historically low turnout.  In Governor Cuomo's re-election in 2014 (33%) and Mayor de Blasio's election in 2013 (28%) the state and city experienced their lowest turnout on record. Some of the low turnout in those elections can be explained by the lack of a real contest.  For Mayor de Blasio, winning the primary assured a sweeping victory in the general election. Governor Cuomo had a closer race, but was excepted to sail to victory and did.  

A more troubling explanation could be voter disillusionment.  It's not hard to become cynical when Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver (two of the "Big 3" in state politics for a long time) were both found guilty of corruption while scores of other state officials have also been charged and convicted.  Voters don't have much faith in state politics and have turned away in New York State and beyond, which is surely fine with varied interests that benefit from the status quo. When voters aren't paying attention, a lot of deals can be made that they wouldn't like regardless of their political persuasion. 

It is natural and even healthy for tension to exist among elected officials.  Though much of the mayor-governor clashes in New York have been ego driven, some are based on policy and vision, which is how any healthy democracy should operate. The fact that the current dynamic between the Mayor and the Governor potentially distracts the media and voters from the larger issues of fair representation, transparency, and accountability at the state level is dangerous, however.  We can already see how the feud impacts affordable housing policy.  

 The ongoing calls to reform Albany must be repeated by the media to reach voters currently sitting out the process.  Only when more voters reenter the political discussion will we see the types of ethics reforms and policy changes that the state, whether up or down, needs.